



The discipline of form: why the premise of institutional form does not apply to Chinese capital, technology, land and labor

Peter Ho

To cite this article: Peter Ho (2020): The discipline of form: why the premise of institutional form does not apply to Chinese capital, technology, land and labor, Journal of Chinese Governance

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23812346.2020.1841975>



Published online: 16 Dec 2020.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



RESEARCH ARTICLE



The discipline of form: why the premise of institutional form does not apply to Chinese capital, technology, land and labor

Peter Ho

School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

ABSTRACT

China is an intellectually overwhelming paradox within development thinking. On the one hand, it is regarded as an economic powerhouse pushing forward decades of sustained growth, which even during major global crises, such as the Corona-epidemic and the 2008 Financial Crisis, bounced back with significant resilience. On the other hand, it appears burdened with all of the 'wrong' institutions: informal, insecure, and autocratic. This collection of papers posits that the paradox is no contradiction when understood through an alternative, theoretical lens: the *function* of institutions precedes *form* when trying to understand institutional performance. Thus, whether institutions are formal or informal, public or private, democratic or autocratic, is of secondary importance to the manner in which they function over time and space. To examine this hypothesis, known as the 'credibility thesis', the collection examines China's institutions that govern: 1) capital; 2) technology; 3) land, and; 4) labor; in effect, state-owned banks, collective firms, corporate law and securities, patents and intellectual property rights, environmental bans, and the civil registration or *hukou* system. In so doing, it not only falsifies the widely prevalent assumption that institutional form determines performance, but concurrently, validates the applicability of the credibility thesis over widely varying sectors and assets.

Abbreviations: CSI Checklist: Credibility Scales and Intervention Checklist; GDP: gross domestic product; IPR: intellectual property right; NOx: nitrous oxides; OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; PM2.5: particulate matter below 2.5 micron size; TVE: Township and Village Enterprise

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 14 June 2020

Accepted 21 October 2020

KEYWORDS

Credibility thesis; property rights and institutions; development theory; endogeneity; institutional form and function

1. Introduction

This collection speaks of the Disciplining of Form, implying the conscious (or unconscious) effort to train, educate, or 'proselytize' polities, societies, and economies in the belief that given institutional forms lead to a certain developmental performance. The effort is clearly discernible in one of the constitutive *premises* of institutional form and

performance. It appears in different versions, such as the assumption that formal institutions promote investments,¹ private property leads to efficient resource distribution or lower transaction costs,² and democratic institutions lead to economic growth.³ However, as will be demonstrated, the assumed relation between institutional form and performance is not only an oversimplification of reality, it is also problematic, even more so within a developing context.

Less than a century ago, China was a poor, semi-colonized Third World country,⁴ and today has emerged as the world's second world power, and an upper middle income nation.⁵ Its vast territory, massive population and significant regional diversity make it difficult to disregard empirically and theoretically. In this sense, the study of the Chinese case is expected to have a profound and lasting influence on development thought. Its scholarly ramification is evident: The contradiction of decades-long, sustained growth coupled to the virtual absence of private, formal, and secure institutions.

To disentangle the paradox the contributions of this collection will dissect the institutional forms upon which China's development was predicated, and assess how these have performed temporally and spatially. To do this as rigorously as possible, each of the papers will apply the credibility thesis to a particular institution around capital, technology, land, and labor. It will be shown there is a significant divergence between the form of these institutions and their predicted performance, both in positive as well as negative ways. At this point, a tantalizing question surfaces: if form is not a decisive factor in the performance of institutions, then what is?

Various scholars have argued that the study of institutions needs a refocusing from form to function,⁶ which has led to the formulation of the credibility thesis.⁷ To date, the thesis has been mainly applied to land,⁸ settlements and housing,⁹ and natural resources, such as grasslands,¹⁰ mineral resources,¹¹ water,¹² and forests.¹³ Yet, apart from some exceptions,¹⁴ the theory has not yet been applied to the property rights of capital, technology, and labor.

It is at this point that the collection of papers may make an important contribution in three ways:

1. It effectively demonstrates that the premise of form and performance does not only have innumerable manifestations (some of which are in full, mutual contradiction, e.g. *secure* rights lead to growth vs. *secure* rights dampen growth), but also proves that it is consistently propagated over various sectors and assets;
2. It shows that research predicated upon the premise of form and performance tends to engender a double paradox: first, the desired institutional forms are *present*, but the predicted positive performance is *absent*; second, the desired institutional forms are *absent*, but positive performance is *present*;
3. In light of the above, the collection ascertains that the credibility thesis may have substantially wider analytical relevance, explanatory value, and theoretical applicability beyond land and land-related resources, including but likely not limited to, capital, technology, and labor.

This introduction proposes an overarching theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework for the contributions. This is achieved through the introduction's division into three sections: 1) the dominant discourse; 2) the paradox; and 3) the new research agenda, subdivided into the collection's theoretical position, its implications, and application. This is followed by concluding remarks.

2. The dominant discourse

In this section, we will examine in more detail how the premise on form is construed. Despite contrasting empirical evidence, the premise has remained resilient and appealing to date. For instance, a group of researchers asserted:

[D]emocracy increases future GDP by encouraging investment, increasing schooling, inducing economic reforms, improving public good provision, and reducing social unrest. We find little support for the view that democracy is a constraint on economic growth for less developed economies.¹⁵

The notion that institutional form is connected to how institutions perform may seem abstract or far-fetched. Yet, the armed conflict that currently ravages Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the social inequality that followed the 1990s' Russian voucher privatization, might serve as sobering reminders that the efforts to promote societal betterment by engineering new institutional forms (regardless whether that pertains to private property, formal law, or democracy, for that matter), are significantly more influential than meets the eye. To better recognize how the prevailing discourse on form is put forward—and thus, also to determine this collection's opposing position—we will dissect in detail how it is framed.

2.1. Capital: banks, cash and stocks

The idea that private, formal and secure property rights, are connected to the (positive) performance of capital can be ascribed to the studies by Short (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1997).¹⁶ As a mode of production, capital may present itself in various ways, ranging from firms, industries, machinery, cash or stocks. Yet, the argument on institutional form has been posited regardless of the type of capital. Let us, for instance, examine one type that gained particular relevance in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the ensuing Eurozone Crisis: banks.

Years before the downfall of Lehman Brothers triggered a worldwide economic crisis, the World Bank's *Finance for Growth* report stated:

Whatever its original objectives, *state ownership* tends to stunt financial sector development, thereby contributing to *slower growth*¹⁷ [emphasis added].

Ironically, as the international community was struggling with the shocks of consecutive crises, and governments over the world rushed to nationalize banks, the World Bank¹⁸ still noted:

The empirical evidence largely suggests that government bank ownership is associated with lower levels of financial development and slower economic growth. Policy makers need to avoid the inefficiencies associated with government bank ownership (*sic!*).

2.2. Technology: intellectual property and patents

The idea that certain institutional forms lead to a given performance is—due to its effects on human requirements for health, education, and sustained livelihood—perhaps nowhere more poignant than in the field of technology. Here, the discussion is coined in terms of ‘strong’ or ‘robust’ vis-à-vis ‘weak’ intellectual property rights (IPR). The connotation to ‘strong IPR’ is tantamount to patent rights that are legally defined, protected, and enforced by the state. Such rights are believed to be conditional and conducive for innovation, investments and growth. Often speaking on behalf of ‘Northern’ multi-nationals (active in such fields as pharmaceuticals, bio-tech, food, agriculture, information and telecommunication), it is argued that:

There is strong evidence that robust intellectual property rights protection fosters economic growth and development.¹⁹

Contrarily, in the context of relations between the Global North and Global South there is a substantive body of literature that highlights that strong IPRs can pose serious impediments to development.²⁰ As Chin and Grossman (1988: 1) wrote²¹:

[T]he interests of the North and the South generally conflict in the matter of protection of intellectual property, with the South benefiting from the ability to pirate technology and the North harmed by such actions. A strong system of intellectual property rights may or may not enhance world efficiency.

Against the backdrop above, it has been suggested that ‘the impact of stronger IPR protection on technology diffusion is ambiguous in theory and depends on a country’s circumstances’.²²

2.3. Land: natural resources, housing and other assets

With regard to land, the premise on institutional form and performance, similar to capital, posits that *formal* and *private* property rights are conditional for development. The argument is deceptively straightforward. By illustration, when natural resources belong to an anonymous collective is it not commonplace that the individual will free-ride? Or, in the absence of formal ownership is it not logical that one is not confident to purchase or sell a house? By extension, the studies on tenure security effectuated through the titling of rights²³ ought to be regarded as part of the same paradigm.

This line of reasoning is reflected in the following statement. Bypassing the fact that, for instance, major portions of the United States and Canada are *public property*,²⁴ Ellickson²⁵ confidently ascertains:

In virtually all of the world’s most prosperous nations, perpetual private land rights are routine.

The argument on formal and private property rights can be traced back to the writings of those connected to the ‘Chicago school of economics’, such as Coase (1960), and Alchian and Demsetz (1973).²⁶ Moreover, it needs mentioning that within that paradigm, land is broadly conceived and may include natural resources such as forest, grassland (and even wildlife), but also land-related assets such as infrastructure and housing.²⁷

2.4. Labor: job security and unionization

When it comes to labour the premise on form and performance is equally promoted as for capital, technology and land, however... and this is where matters become increasingly convoluted, it is posited in a *reversed* manner.²⁸ Whereas the security and formalization of capital and land are seen as imperative for positive performance, the desired forms for labor are paradoxically posited to be *less* security (of employment) and *less* formalization (e.g. trade unionization and contracts). The Jobs Studies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development²⁹ (OECD) are an exponent of this thought,³⁰ and has continuously resurfaced in different forms ever since. Echoing the same argument, a later study on Latin American labour markets asserted:

[J]ob security policies have substantial impact on the level and the distribution of employment in Latin America. They *reduce* employment and promote *inequality*.³¹ Heckman and Pages (2000: 2) [*italics added*].³²

3. The paradox

The premise that institutional form decides performance is haunted by an elusive, eternal paradox: the impossibility to establish a straightforward, mutual relation. In the words of political scientist Hale³³ '[F]ormal institutions rarely operate as assumed'. For starters, scholars have demonstrated that the assumed positive relation between democracy and growth needs rethinking (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2004; Barro, 1996; Helliwell, 1994).³⁴ Moreover, when applying our analytical framework, it can be ascertained that this empirical paradox is equally discernible with regard to:

- Capital (Marois and Güngen, 2016; Fries and Taci, 2005)³⁵;
- Technology (Kim et al., 2012; Furukawa, 2007; Schneider, 2005)³⁶;
- Land (Chen, 2020; Clarke, 2018; Ho and Spoor, 2006; Kim, 2004)³⁷;
- Labour (Miyamura, 2016; Santos, 2009; Besley and Burgess, 2004).³⁸

3.1. A Double manifestation

It is important to realize that the form-performance paradox may manifest itself in a dual manner. One, the desired institutional forms are *present*, but there is *no* positive performance (i.e. no economic growth, or by extension, no higher investments, lower transaction costs, better health care and less poverty). In this regard, one may recall, for instance, the downfall of privately owned banks during the Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone crisis, and the failure of formal, democratic institutions in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan after an exogenously induced regime-change.

Two, the paradox also manifests itself when desired institutional forms are *absent*, but there *is* positive performance. The Chinese case is a case-in-point. When shifting the analysis from a single time-point towards a longer trajectory, the paradox is even more evident, caused by assumptions of teleology and convergence.³⁹ Knowingly or unknowingly, many feel that the institutional forms that underlie Western economies and industrialized societies will, or even, *should* prevail over others. However, instead

of the assumed teleology and convergence from informal to formal, common to private, and traditional to modern institutions, one continues to observe institutional *hybrids* and a long term persistence of ‘undesirable’ communal and informal forms.

In this context, Portes and Sassen-Koob⁴⁰ contended the idea that ‘informal economic activities are primarily a feature of Third World economies, in which they function as a refuge from destitution (...) presumably destined to disappear with the advance of modern, industry-led growth’. Contrarily, they concluded:

These assumptions, including the identification of informality with conditions in the less developed countries, are wrong (*ibid.*: 30).

3.2. Why the paradox persists

Giving up on the premise of form versus performance involves the restructuring of an entire paradigm, its associated methodology, training, and field of study. As will be discussed in the conclusion, apart from efforts to save the discourse by twisting theoretical foundations (which actually makes matters worse, due to the ensuing inconsistencies), scholars have tried to deal with the paradox by including more variables, more countries, or more levels of data aggregation. However, as Freeman⁴¹ noted, the endeavour to establish a relation between institutional form and performance is ‘unlikely to be settled by additional studies using aggregate data and making cross-country comparisons’.

There are three reasons why the premise on form and performance remains ever-eluding and paradoxical:

- First, it suffers from an inordinately ‘binary understanding ... [of institutions] that fails to capture the relational character of legal entitlements’⁴²;
- Second, the evolution of institutional form is not one of universality, convergence, and teleology—developing from common to private, informal to formal, and simple to complex—but one that is time and space-dependent;
- Third, institutional form is neither cause nor effect of, but *interacts* with context. Put differently, the relation of form versus performance is not causal but *endogenous*, by which the dependent variable becomes the independent variable and *vice versa*.

The reasons above explain why *state-ownership* can persist and lead to booming property markets in metropolises like London, Vancouver, Hong Kong, or Amsterdam. Similarly, it provides a plausible explanation why informal arrangements are as omnipresent in developed and industrialized countries, as we believe they are only in developing countries, albeit their rationalization away from direct perception might prevent us from recognizing this truth.

4. The collection's position: a research agenda

4.1. The thesis

As argued above, institutional form alone can never be a reliable predictor or *explanans* for a certain performance. What is missing? Chang (2007: 20)⁴³ pointed to the direction in which we might have to search:

Institutional forms may not matter that much as the *same function* can be performed by different institutional forms [emphasis added].

What Chang hints at is a reappraisal of function as a critical notion in the analysis of institutions' performance. Over the years, numerous researchers from different disciplines have underscored the need to (re)include function for a better understanding of institutions, regardless of whether that was ascertained at a general level,⁴⁴ or more specifically, in relation to, for instance, finance⁴⁵ or natural resources⁴⁶.

In the context above, the credibility thesis⁴⁷ posits:

[W]hat ultimately determines the performance of institutions is not their form in terms of formality, privatization, or security, but their spatially and temporally defined function. In different wording, institutional function presides over form; the former can be expressed by its credibility, that is, the perceived social support at a given time and space.⁴⁸

It needs emphasizing that the reappraisal of function in institutional analysis is *not* tantamount to a revival of 'Parsonsian' or structural functionalism. This needs to be seen along a dual dimension.

For one, function is employed as a concept in analyzing *institutions* rather than using it to explain society as a whole. In this sense, the theoretical effort builds on premises of Original Institutionalism as posited by its early proponents,⁴⁹ and its later developers.⁵⁰ The approach analyzes the workings of 'messy' institutions in real times and real places, rather than taking them as an unopened, abstract 'black box'⁵¹ that may be universally correlated with prices, investments and transaction costs.

In this approach, the rise of nations or industrial growth has little to do with the level of privatization or formality of institutions, but all the more with credibility, i.e. the extent to which institutions serve a purpose that is commonly shared by actors. There are perhaps as many definitions of institutions as there are institutions.⁵² Yet, elaborate definitions as 'the more enduring features of social life'⁵³ or 'the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction',⁵⁴ although useful in their own right, leads attention away from the essence: institutions' regulatory nature. Therefore, it might be better and more concisely conceptualized as a 'set of rules'.⁵⁵

It needs emphasis that an institution is conceptualized as a *set* of rather than a *singular* rule. Thus, for instance, the rule that one should not cross the street on a red light is *not* regarded as an institution. Yet, the rules that together regulate one should abide by the traffic lights, walk on the right hand side of the pavement, look at two sides before crossing, and must not walk on the motorway constitute a 'pedestrian institution' (and more specifically, a continental, West-European one).⁵⁶

The second dimension that sets this collection's effort apart from a revival of structural functionalism is defined along the premise of *disequilibrium* as opposed to

equilibrium.⁵⁷ Within a structural functionalist view, social structures—or institutions, for that matter—were seen as constitutive organs or organisms that worked together to achieve an overall equilibrium through their individual functions. Thus, every social structure possessed a function that ensured the stability and cohesiveness of society.⁵⁸ It is why structural functionalism was criticized for being unable to account for contradictions and conflict, and was termed ‘consensus theory’.⁵⁹

What is posited instead is a view that conceptualizes function and institutions as subject to *continuous change*, rather than seeing them in static terms. Social, political and economic actors negotiate, renegotiate and re-renegotiate the ‘rules of the game’ *ad infinitum*, in line with changing expectations, intentions and external conditions. On the one hand, actors’ interactions, choices and conflicts propel a process of endogenous evolution during which institutions shape actors’ actions (and *vice versa*) while functionally adapting to their needs. On the other hand, what may function at one time or space, may well lose that functionality (and credibility, for that matter) at another time or space.

4.2. The implications: how to go from here?

In the previous sections, we reviewed how the premise on institutional form was put forward, and how it permeated discussions over certain preferred institutions in the governance of capital, technology, land, and labor. It is what we described as a ‘disciplining of form’. We subsequently ascertained that this premise leads to an immediate paradox with a dual manifestation:

- Preferred institutions are present, but positive performance does *not* materialize;
- Preferred institutions are absent, but there *is* positive performance.

We ascertained there are several reasons why the efforts to salvage the premise on form and performance are likely to fail: i) institutions need to be seen as continuous, rather than in binary terms (of formal versus informal, public versus private, and secure versus insecure); ii) institutional evolution is not characterized by universality, teleology and convergence but hinges on a spatio-temporal, thus, coincidental context, and lastly; iii) institutions are not determined by causality but interaction, thus, endogeneity. Against this backdrop, we posited the collection’s position, otherwise known as the credibility thesis: the form of institutions follows from their function.

4.3. The application

To validate the credibility thesis—and falsify its opposite, i.e. institutional form decides performance—the contributions apply the thesis to capital, technology, land and labour as set in the Chinese context. The collection’s argument as discussed in the preceding sections is summarized in Figure 1.

The collection starts with Yeung’s contribution, which studies the property rights of state-owned banks. For many conventional economists, state-owned banks in China, with their ambiguously defined property rights and inefficient operations, are regarded




Figure 1. The argument. *Referring to formal, private and secure institutions (or property rights). **As can be expressed in terms such as GDP, investments, sustainability, or poverty reduction. ***Manifested in a dual manner, i.e. (1) desired forms present, but negative performance; (2) desired forms absent, but positive performance. Source: illustrated by author.

as a stumbling block for economic reforms. Instead, and as the Disciplining of Form requires, property rights ought to be private, formal, and secure. Contrarily, following the initial public offerings of Chinese state-owned banks in the mid-2000s, changes in property rights blurred the boundaries between public and private property while the state continued to play a critical role in the regulation of this 'hybrid property'. Yeung moots that the hybrid nature of the property rights of state banks maintains credibility as a convenient channel for the state to provide counter-cyclical lending to buffer exogenous (economic) shocks and provide long-term financial support for development targets in China's economy-in-transition. Put differently, instead of an unsustainable operation, as argued by conventional institutional analysts, the undefined property rights and favourable lending practices to state-owned enterprises actually contribute to their profitability and thus the persistence of hybrid property and their credibility.

In the second paper on capital, we turn to China's collectively owned sector. Township and village enterprises (TVEs) have played a significant role in the economic development of the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, the property rights of TVEs have been controversial for a long time. Scholars ascertained that TVEs are a 'vaguely defined cooperative' or a 'communal organization' without 'well-defined property rights'. Strikingly, TVEs have been highly successful and deemed 'as efficient as private firms' which stands in contrast with the premise over the form of property rights.

Contrary to focusing on institutional form, various authors have pointed to the manner in which the TVE functions by also 'dealing with the role of local citizens and members of TVEs,' as '[w]ithout the participation of local citizens and members of TVEs, the local governments alone would be unable to make the TVEs a success'.⁶⁰ This led to the conclusion that the TVE—despite its ambiguous property rights—actually functioned as a communal firm that could effectively mobilize the means of production under its control.⁶¹ Echoing this view, the contribution by Dai and Taube maintain that the TVEs' institutional structure—regardless of its insecure, informal and

vaguely defined form—is indicative of its credibility that allows optimal use of labour, land and capital. The scholarly literature about TVEs' reforms and their contribution to the Chinese economy is extensive, yet surprisingly, virtually vanished after the 2000s. This paper revisits the role of TVEs and the policies that govern them, in light of new discussions about credibility and function, and by so doing, highlights new changes in their institutional structure.

The third paper, discusses both capital and technology, and applies the credibility thesis respectively to corporate law and securities, as well as to patent law and intellectual property. A bone of contention in the debate on property rights is the dilemma whether market development (performance) gives rise to law (as an institutional form), or whether the law influences market development. However, by moving away from a focus on institutional form in lieu of function, one can distinguish the endogenous, evolutionary process that shapes institutions. In effect, it is not a matter of causality in which X causes Y or *vice versa*, but a matter of interaction, whereby both engender and influence each other. This exact issue is taken up by Yueh's contribution, who proposes that legal and economic reforms give rise to, and reinforce each other, while the market is underpinned by evolving institutions that are shaped by the expectations of the actors in the economy. A comparative examination of China and the United States at a similar stage of legal-institutional of corporate law, securities and patent law, provides support for an evolutionary, endogenous process.

After having reviewed the institutions governing capital and technology, the next contribution moves on to land. In the governance of land, too, there is often an overt focus on certain desired institutional forms. This may not only take the form of private or public property rights, but may also manifest itself as a complete ban or prohibition on certain socio-economic behaviour. Prohibition or an institutional intervention by 'dictating what shall *not* be done'⁶² may work when the credibility of existing institutions is already low. Yet, as numerous studies have ascertained, the success and failure of institutional interventions critically hinges on whether the credibility of the newly intended institution aligns with what already exists on the ground (see application of the CSI-Checklist or Credibility Scales and Intervention Checklist in various studies).⁶³

The contribution by Fan, Zhang and Li in this collection underscores this principle. By zooming in on the ban on the open burning of crop residues in China, their study constitutes a textbook example of how government prohibitions may go awry when that elementary truth is forgotten. Stubble burning or intentionally setting fire to the straw and stalks that remain after grains have been harvested, has a major environmental impact: it releases carbon dioxide, methane, and contributes to smog (which includes carbon monoxide, ammonia, and NOx), as well as PM2.5 particles. It is estimated that in Asia alone, a total of 248.2 million tons of crop residues are burned annually, of which China accounts for a quarter (or 62 million tons).⁶⁴

In an effort to stamp out the polluting practices of stubble burning, the Chinese government resorted to an outright ban. However, by solely focusing on the form of the policy, it was neglected that the function of stubble burning is driven by sheer necessity, as farmers have no means or funds to turn under or transport the stalk. Moreover, generally the disabled, infirm and elderly are left to clear the fields whereas the healthy adults move to the cities in search of off-farm employment after the

harvest. The sole recourse in these conditions is burning. The complicated and, at times, contradictory dynamics between institutional form and function, is ascertained by Fan and his co-authors as they find out that the policy on stubble burning is unable to rally much credibility amongst the farming population.

The final paper of this special issue takes us to an important institution governing labor in China: the *hukou* or household registration system, which essentially serves as a ‘domestic passport’, regulating population distribution and rural-urban migration. In effect, with a rural *hukou* one has no access to formal, urban facilities, including employment, housing, health care, education, and social welfare, while the reverse is true for those with an urban *hukou*. In light of its discriminatory nature, the *hukou* system has been severely criticized and even likened to the South African system of apartheid.⁶⁵ Yet, the debates over the *hukou* system have tended to become overly dichotomous or binary in nature: it must or must *not* be abolished, it does or does *not* have a negative influence on labor mobility, it is or is *not* socially exclusionist. At the same time, by merely looking at the institutional form of *hukou* as an institution of segregation one disregards how it functions in real times and real spaces.

It is this risk to which the credibility thesis draws attention, and why it calls for a refocusing of institutional research. In this context, and writing on labor institutions in India, Miyamura (2016, 1265–1266)⁶⁶ duly noted:

[T]he credibility thesis focuses the analysis and debates on the varied and dynamic ways in which prevailing collective bargaining arrangements and labour organisations are supported or contested by bargaining agents, and how these conflicts are managed at a given time and space (...), instead of the distortionist–institutionalist debate on whether unionisation is harmful or conducive for the functioning of labour markets, [it] will examine conditions under which trade unions of various types and other labour organisations persist or are overthrown.

In exactly this vein, the final paper of the collection, examines the *hukou* system as one of the most enduring institutions that defines social citizenship of Chinese residents. As Shi remarks in his paper, whereas much research focuses on the Chinese case, significantly less attention is paid to the *hukou* system in Taiwan, let alone, a comparison of the both. This article aims to enrich the study of the two *hukou* systems in terms of their functions in determining the access of cross-strait immigrants to the social benefits of the respective host countries. By drawing on the ‘credibility thesis’, the paper’s analytical lens is placed on the changes and continuities of the institutional functions that underlie the apparent persistence of institutional forms. When granting, or conversely, withholding cross-strait immigrants the access to local social benefits, the *hukou* systems perform various critical functions. Often the realization of these functions mutually contradict, complicated by the disputes and contestation over the politics of identity regarding ‘Chineseness’ or ‘Taiwanese-ness’. This in turn, has profound implications for the social inclusion or exclusion of cross-strait immigrants.

5. Conclusion: foregoing the premise of form and performance

Anyone who cites China’s economic miracle as evidence of the superiority of “state capitalism” [needs] to stop and think again. (...) In truth, China is a mixed system that

combines capitalism and socialism—just like every other country in the world. This is equally true of the United States and European countries, all of which blend—in different proportions—capitalist and socialist elements in their economic systems.⁶⁷

The citation above touches on the heart of this collection of papers. The so-called ‘Chinese paradox’, in which a remarkable level of development and growth is coupled to the persistence of all the ‘wrong’ institutions, i.e. institutional arrangements that are not proposed by the premise of form and performance, is caused by a preoccupation over the form of institutions: democratic/authoritarian, public/private, and formal/informal. Contrarily, what this collection of papers argues is that the paradox is no paradox when we reject the obsession with institutional form to refocus on the function of institutions as expressed by their credibility. In this context, Fan et al.⁶⁸ aptly remarked:

According to traditional institutional theory, an institution can continue to function effectively only when it has clear property rights and a complete form. In the real world, the picture is more complex. (...) An imperfect or even ill-defined institution may continue forever because it fulfills its function effectively. An institution that appears perfect in form may not be credible in the implementation process because its function has not been realized.

The various papers that have been brought together here ascertain precisely this principle, and do so for the institutions over widely diverging sectors. In this endeavour, the papers confirm earlier studies on the credibility thesis, whether these pertain to the property rights of state-owned banks in Turkey,⁶⁹ labor market institutions and unionization in India,⁷⁰ or government bans on overgrazing.⁷¹ Contrarily, even though the premise of form and performance leads to an immediate, double paradox, pointing towards its falsification, foregoing of this premise will neither come easily, nor willingly.

In fact, there have been numerous attempts to salvage the premise. Interestingly, these tend to focus on the paradox’ latter manifestation (positive performance in the *absence* of desired institutions), rather than the former (negative performance in the *presence* of desired institutions). There is no adequate explanation for this, apart from an educated guess that negative performance in the presence of desired institutions (such as a decline in asset value or a rise in poverty *after* formalization or privatization) might be an uncomfortable truth, or perhaps an overly obvious ‘empirical anomaly’ to address. Whatever the case, conceptual ‘add-ons’ to account for the paradox might invoke more inconsistencies than they solve, as will be ascertained below.

The most straightforward, yet, least plausible attempt to salvage the premise on form is through refutation. In this reading, the divergence of institutional forms from their predicted performance is simply denied. For instance, in an attempt to reapply the argument that formal and private property rights propelled the rise of the West, Hou and Hou⁷² conclude:

Regardless of the West or China, the directional pattern of the evolution from Feudalism to a laissez faire economy is *common*. Based on this, the prospect of the current economic reform in China is an optimistic one. It has exhibited *the same* evolution phases as in the historical past (...). If history is to repeat itself, China will eventually move into a free market economy [emphasis added].

A different effort, in fact, the reinvention of an old argument,⁷³ is the notion that authoritarian power can block—what is otherwise—the teleological tendency of institutions to evolve into private, formal, and secure forms.⁷⁴ This explanation, however, leads to a series of tantalizing questions. If excessive power can stall institutional evolution or convergence, then why did the removal of authoritarian institutions during, e.g. the Arab Spring, not increase institutional performance but rather the reverse?⁷⁵ And by contrast, why—despite its autocratic institutions—has China been so successful in social, economic, and humanitarian terms by decreasing poverty, improving education, and ensuring improved health care?^{76,77}

At this point, a final attempt to save the discourse has been launched: informal, insecure and communal institutions that perform well are merely ‘second-best’. Before considering this, it must be established that the explanation is, similar to the idea of excessive power as blocking institutional change, a *reinvention*; in fact, of that what was ascertained over a half century earlier.⁷⁸ In this context it might be beneficial to recall that allegedly new concepts often derive from the fact that ‘originality is the product of a faulty memory’ (Wirth quoted in Becker and Richards, 2007, 136).⁷⁹

The idea of ‘second-best’—meaning that ‘such institutions will often diverge greatly from *best practice*’⁸⁰—is problematic on two accounts: it is depreciatory, inasmuch as it is apologetic. It is depreciatory, in its suggestion that institutions of developing countries in general, and of China in particular—are substandard to those of the West. At the same time, it is the way how the development of rapidly developing and emerging economies is made admissible. In that sense, it is apologetic.

When it comes to theoretical influence and empirical leverage, developing countries in the Global South have substantially less to wield vis-à-vis the developed countries in the Global North. It is a likely reason that titles such as ‘*Why Capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else*’ are so much more marketable than would, for instance, a potential title as ‘*Why private property fails in the South and informal institutions triumph in the North*’. It is probably also why the disciplining of institutional forms as propagated through such works remains palatable and persuasive, despite contradictory evidence. In this context, even when ‘the colonial empire’ does write back,⁸¹ its calls to be heard often fall on deaf ears, although perhaps... perhaps less so for a country with the size, scope and impact of China. It is the rationale for bringing together the set of papers you have in hand.

Notes

1. Micelli et al., “The Dynamic Effects of Land,” 370–389.
2. Alchian and Demsetz, “The Property Rights Paradigm,” 16–27.
3. Papaioannou et al., “Democratisation and Growth,” 1520–1551.
4. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chinese foreign relations with most major world powers evolved into a sort of semi-colonialism as Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and (to a lesser extent) the US coerced trade and territorial concessions in a series of so-called “unequal treaties”. Concessions in China consisted of large tracts of granted areas, governed and occupied by foreign powers.
5. Although China still lags behind the high-income countries; according to the lending classifications of the World Bank (2017), China was labelled a “low income country” in 1987, and was considered an “upper middle income” in 2016.

6. Chang, *Institutional Change and Economic Development*; Aron, "Growth and Institutions," 99–135; Dixon, "Function Before Form," 579–600; Agrawal et al., "Governing Mitigation in Agriculture," 270–326.
7. Ho, "The Credibility Thesis," 13–27; Ho, *Unmaking China's Development*.
8. Koroso et al., "Land Institutions' Credibility," 553–564; Clarke, "Form and Function of China's," 902–912.
9. Oranje et al., "Rapid Urbanisation to Non-Metropolitan," 102487; McClymont and Sheppard, "Credibility Without Legitimacy?" 102520; Zhang, "The Credibility of Slums," 876–890.
10. Fan et al., "Institutional Credibility Measurement," 212–225; Zhao and Rokpelnis, "Local Perceptions of Grassland Degradation," 1206–1223.
11. Fold et al., "Grounding Institutions Through Informal Practice," 922–931.
12. Gomes and Hermans, "Institutional Function and Urbanization in Bangladesh," 932–941; Mollinga "Secure Rights and Non-credibility," 1310–1331.
13. Nor-Hisham and Ho, "A Conditional Trinity as 'No-Go'," 1177–1205.
14. Miyamura, "Rethinking Labour Market Institutions," 1262–1284; Marois, Thomas and Güngen, "Credibility and Class in the Evolution," 1285–1309.
15. Acemoglu et al., "Democracy Does Cause Growth," 1–32.
16. Short, "Ownership, Control, Financial Structure," 203–249; Shleifer and Vishny, "A Survey of Corporate Governance," 737–783.
17. World Bank, *Finance for Growth*.
18. World Bank, *Global Financial Development Report 2013*.
19. Lybecker, "The Economic Case for Strong Protection".
20. Branstetter et al., "Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights," 321–349; Chang, "Intellectual Property Rights and Economic," 287–309; Lee and Edwin, "Intellectual Property Protection," 181–186.
21. Chin and Grossman, "Intellectual Property Rights," 1–33.
22. Falvey et al., "The Role of Intellectual Property".
23. Micelli et al., "The Dynamic Effects of Land," 370–389.
24. For instance, the percentage of state-owned land is close to 90 percent in Canada, and 28 percent in the United States (Neimanis, 2011; Johnson and Rebala 2016).
25. Ellickson, "The Costs of Complex Land Titles".
26. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," 1–44; Alchian and Demsetz, "The Property Rights Paradigm," 16–27.
27. DeLasaux et al., "Forest and Rangeland Owners Value," 184–191; Campos et al., "Contingent Valuation of Woodland-Owner," 240–252; Smith, "Resolving the Tragedy," 439–468; From a scholarly point of view, housing and other built structures are often studied in connection to land. For this reason, they have here been categorized under land although, arguably, they can also be regarded as a form of capital.
28. Note that such flexible logic is not only apparent in the case of labour market institutions. Malesky and London (2014: 406) also observed it, for instance, in the thinking on the role of authoritarianism in China's development. In their words: "[F]ascinating is how often the same attributes employed to describe success are used to predict the eminent collapse of the system (e.g. relationship lending becomes crony capitalism)".
29. OECD. *The OECD Jobs Study*.
30. As the report states: "Employment protection legislation is designed to discourage dismissals by raising the cost to employers of releasing workers. But it can also make employers more reluctant to hire new workers. Countries, mainly in Europe, which have particularly stringent legislation generally have a high rate of long-term unemployment ..." (OECD, 1994: 34).
31. Heckman and Pages, "The Cost of Job Security Regulation," 7773.

32. In a similar vein, Mussa (2002: 9), former chief economist of the IMF noted: "If Argentina had a more flexible economic system, especially in its labor markets, its economy would have been more able to adapt to the rigors of the convertibility plan, unemployment would have been lower, growth would have been stronger, fiscal deficits would have been smaller, and interest rates would have been lower".
33. Hale, "Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics," 581–617.
34. Glaeser et al., "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" 271–303; Barro, "Democracy and Growth," 1–27; Helliwell, "Empirical Linkages," 225–248.
35. Marois and Güngen, "Credibility and Class," 1285–1309; Fries and Taci, "Cost Efficiency of Banks in Transition," 55–81.
36. Kim et al., "Appropriate Intellectual Property Protection" 358–375; Furukawa, "The Protection of Intellectual Property," 3644–3670; Schneider, "International Trade, Economic Growth," 529–547.
37. Chen, "Institutional Credibility and Informal Institutions," 102519; Ho and Spoor, "Whose Land?" 580–587; Kim, "Appropriate Intellectual Property Protection," 358–375.
38. Miyamura, "Rethinking Labour Market Institutions," 1262–1284; Santos, "Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform," 43–106; Besley and Burgess, "Can Labor Regulation Hinder," 91–134.
39. The problem of time in pinning down specific features of Chinese development (regardless whether these relate to state-led growth, gradualism or experimentalism) has also been observed by Naughton (2008: 126): "[A]lmost every characteristic of the [Chinese] transition process through 1992 has been shown inapplicable after 1993".
40. Portes and Sassen-Koob, "Making It Underground," 30–61.
41. Freeman, "Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders," 129–145.
42. Santos, "Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform," 43–106.
43. Chang, *Institutional Change and Economic Development*.
44. Aron, "Growth and Institutions," 99–135.
45. Dixon, "Function Before Form," 579–600.
46. Agrawal et al., "Governing Mitigation in Agriculture".
47. Ho, "The Credibility Thesis".
48. The notion of credibility has been more specifically defined as "the collective expression of the functionality of institutions, or, more specifically, the reflection of actors' cumulative perceptions of endogenously emerged institutions as a common arrangement" (Ho, 2016: 1125).
49. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*; Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*. Commons, *Institutional Economics*; Commons, *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*; Clark, "Recent Developments in Economics," 213–306.
50. Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*; Bromley, *Making the Commons Work*. Oakerson, "Analyzing the Commons," 41–59; Hodgson, *The Evolution of Institutional Economics*.
51. Ho, "An Endogenous Theory of Property Rights," 1121–1144.
52. Hodgson, "What Are Institutions?" 1–25.
53. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*.
54. North, "Institutions," 97–112.
55. A succinct definition can be of value for different reasons: 1) it keeps analysis clear, as it forces the analyst to specify *what* rules the institution is composed of; 2) it traverses disciplinary boundaries, as any social discipline – whether that is political science, anthropology, economics, sociology, law, or geography – can study rules; 3) it allows for flexibility as widely varying institutions such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Thai monarchy, or village forest rights may be examined as a "set of rules".
56. In other contexts, one does not necessarily need to abide by the traffic lights, can walk on both sides of the pavement, is not obliged to look prior to crossing provided that this is done slowly, and can walk on the motorway (even on both sides). Markedly, these rules are known *and* respected by other traffic users, who adjust their behaviour in anticipation. Moreover, institutions and property rights are concepts that are simultaneously and interchangeably used, adding to conceptual plethora. From this collection's perspective,

property rights – regardless whether one looks at formal ownership or customary rights – are a set of rules, and can thus be regarded as an institution, albeit an institution is not automatically a property right.

57. Freeman and Carchedi, *Marx and Non-Equilibrium Economics*; Fisher, *Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics*; Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*.
58. In effect, function was used to account for the balance or equilibrium of institutions (Parsons, 1951: 324). Or, as Johnson (1993: 117) noted it was used in explaining “the stability and ongoingness of systems of interaction”.
59. To better account for change, Merton proposed a distinction between function and non-function (dysfunction) and intended (manifest) and unintended (latent) functions (Merton, 1949: 61). However, what he (and Parsons) did not consider is that the notion that “social change might *not* derive from an anomalous, socially disruptive *dysfunction*, whether intentionally or unintentionally, but from the very nature of society and economy itself. Thus, change, conflict, and instability are the fundamental forces of human interaction rather than being an aberration” (Ho, 2017: 150).
60. Pei, “Township-Village Enterprises”.
61. Pei, “Collective Land Ownership”; Pei, “Township-Village Enterprises”; Weitzman and Xu, “Chinese Township-Village Enterprises,” 121–145.
62. Ho, *Unmaking China's Development*.
63. Zhang, “The Credibility of Slums,” 876–890; Arvanitidis and Papagiannitsis, “Urban Open Spaces as a Commons,” 102480; Zeković et al., “The Credibility of Illegal,” 102548; Liu and Zhang, “Cities Without Slums?” 102652.
64. Streets et al. “Biomass Burning in Asia,” 10–20.
65. Chan and Zhang, “The Hukou System and Rural,” 18–55; Alexander and Chan, “Does China Have an Apartheid?” 609–629.
66. Miyamura, “Rethinking Labour Market Institutions,” 1262–1284.
67. Zitelman, “State Capitalism?”
68. Fan et al., “Institutional Credibility Measurement,” 213.
69. Marois and Güngen, “Credibility and Class,” 1285–1309.
70. Miyamura, “Rethinking Labour Market Institutions,” 1262–1284.
71. Ho, “An Endogenous Theory of,” 1121–1144.
72. Hou and Hou, “Evolution of Economic Institutions,” 363–379.
73. Twelve years earlier, in North, “Economic performance through time” exactly *the same* hypothesis was posed, and in *the same* journal.
74. Acemoglu and Robinson, “De Facto Political Power,” 326.
75. Fawcett, “The Iraq War,” 325–343.
76. UNDP, *The Millennium Development Goals*.
77. Malesky and London (2014: 406) ascertained that, amongst other factors, the “maintenance of an authoritarian regime during dramatic economic change” as a factor of successful development might be open for debate in the Chinese and Vietnamese cases. In their words: “When we push deeper into the underpinnings of any of these components, disagreements even among knowledgeable experts quickly emerge”.
78. Lipsey and Kelvin, “The General Theory,” 11–32.
79. Becker and Richards, *Writing for Social Scientists*.
80. Rodrik, “Second-Best Institutions,” 1–12.
81. Rushdie, “The Empire Writes Back,” 8.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on Contributor

Peter Ho is Professor at Zhejiang University and the founding editor of the *Elements on Global Development Studies* published by Cambridge University Press (see: www.recoland.eu). He published numerous articles and books, including with Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, and Wiley-Blackwell. Ho achieved the ERC Consolidator Grant, EAEPE Kapp Prize, China Rural Development Award, and title of National Expert of China. He is chair of ICARDC (www.icardc.org) and board member of several SSCI-rated journals. He reviews for the Cheung Kong scholarships, National Global Talents Program, US-NSF, and ESRC.

References

- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. "De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence?" *The American Economic Review* 96, no. 2 (2006): 325–330. doi:[10.1257/000282806777212549](https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806777212549).
- Acemoglu, Daron, Naidu Suresh, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. *Democracy Does Cause Growth*, 1–32. NBER Working Papers, No. 20004. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014.
- Agrawal, A., L. Wollenberg, and L. Persha. "Governing Mitigation in Agriculture-Forest Landscapes." *Global Environmental Change* 29 (2014): 270–326. doi:[10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.10.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.10.001).
- Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. "The Property Rights Paradigm." *The Journal of Economic History* 33, no. 1 (1973): 16–27. doi:[10.1017/S0022050700076403](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700076403).
- Alexander, P., and A. Chan. "Does China Have an Apartheid Pass System?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 30, no. 4 (2004): 609–629. doi:[10.1080/13691830410001699487](https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830410001699487).
- Aron, Janine. "Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence." *The World Bank Research Observer* 15, no. 1 (2000): 99–135. doi:[10.1093/wbro/15.1.99](https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/15.1.99).
- Arvanitidis, Paschalis A., and George Papagiannitsis. "Urban Open Spaces as a Commons: Exploring the Credibility Thesis in the Selfgoverned Navarinou Park of Athens, Greece." *Cities* 97 (2020): 102480. doi:[10.1016/j.cities.2019.102480](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102480).
- Barro, Robert J. "Democracy and Growth." *Journal of Economic Growth* 1, no. 1 (1996): 1–27. doi:[10.1007/BF00163340](https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00163340).
- Becker, Howard S., and Pamela Richards. *Writing for Social Scientists: How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book, or Article*. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Besley, Timothy, and Robin Burgess. "Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119, no. 1 (2004): 91–134. doi:[10.1162/003355304772839533](https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839533).
- Branstetter, Lee G., Raymond Fisman, and C. Fritz Foley. "Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U. S. Firm-Level Panel Data." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 121, no. 1 (2006): 321–349. doi:[10.1162/qjec.2006.121.1.321](https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2006.121.1.321).
- Bromley, Daniel W., ed. *Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy*. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1992.
- Campos, Pablo, Jose L. Oviedo, Alejandro Caparrós, Lynn Huntsinger, and Inocencio Coelho. "Contingent Valuation of Woodland-Owner Private Amenities in Spain, Portugal, and California." *Rangeland Ecology & Management* 62, no. 3 (2009): 240–252. doi:[10.2111/08-178R2.1](https://doi.org/10.2111/08-178R2.1).
- Chan, K. W., and L. Zhang. "The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes." *The China Quarterly* 160 (1999): 818–855. doi:[10.1017/S0305741000001351](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741000001351).
- Chang, Ha-Joon. "Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development: Historical Lessons and Emerging Issues." *Journal of Human Development* 2, no. 2 (2001): 287–309. doi:[10.1080/14649880120067293](https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880120067293).
- Chang, Ha-Joon. *Institutional Change and Economic Development*. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2007.

- Chen, Huirong. "Institutional Credibility and Informal Institutions: The Case of Extralegal Land Development in China." *Cities* 97 (2020): 102519. doi:[10.1016/j.cities.2019.102519](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102519).
- Cheng, Yuk-shing, and Shu-ki Tsang. "Agricultural Land Reform in a Mixed System: The Chinese Experience of 1984–1994." *China Information* 10, no. 3–4 (1996): 44–74.
- Chin, Judith C., and Gene M. Grossman. *Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade*, 1–33. NBER Working Paper No. 2769. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1988.
- Clarke, Donald. "Form and Function of China's Urban Land Regime: The Irrelevance of State Ownership." *Land Use Policy* 79, no. 12 (2018): 902–912. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.11.008](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.11.008).
- Clark, John Maurice. "Recent Developments in Economics." in: Edward C. Hayes (ed.) *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, 213–306. Philadelphia, PA: Lippencott, 1927.
- Coase, R. H. "The Problem of Social Cost." *Journal of Law and Economics* 3 (1960): 1–44. doi:[10.1086/466560](https://doi.org/10.1086/466560).
- Commons, John R. *Institutional Economics*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961.
- Commons, John R. *Legal Foundations of Capitalism*. New York, NY: Macmillan, 1924.
- Coser, Lewis. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1956.
- Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom. "A Grammar of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (1995): 582–600. doi:[10.2307/2082975](https://doi.org/10.2307/2082975).
- Davy, Benjamin. "After Form. The Credibility Thesis Meets Property Theory." *Land Use Policy* 79, no. 12 (2018): 854–862. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.02.036](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.02.036).
- Deininger, K., and S. Q. Jin. "Securing Property Rights in Transition: lessons from Implementation of China's Rural Land Contracting Law." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 70, no. 1–2 (2009): 22–38. doi:[10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.001).
- DeLasaux, Michael, Sabrina L. Drill, Shasta Ferranto, Christy M. Getz, Lynn Huntsinger, Maggi Kelly, Gary M. Nakamura, William C. Stewart, and Yana Valachovic. "Forest and Rangeland Owners Value Land for Natural Amenities and as Financial Investment." *California Agriculture* 65, no. 4 (2011): 184–191. doi:[10.3733/ca.v065n04p184](https://doi.org/10.3733/ca.v065n04p184).
- Dixon, Adam D. "Function Before Form: Macro-Institutional Comparison and the Geography of Finance." *Journal of Economic Geography* 12, no. 3 (2012): 579–600. doi:[10.1093/jeg/lbr043](https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbr043).
- Ellickson, Robert C. *The Costs of Complex Land Titles: Two Examples from China*, 1–23. Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 3604. Yale Law School, 2012. Accessed April 20, 2016. http://digital-commons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3604/
- Eusebius of Caesarea. *Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation for the Gospel)*. Translated by Edward Hamilton Gifford (Originally Translated in 1903). Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2002.
- Fan, Shengyue, Jinfei Yang, Wenwen Liu, and He Wang. "Institutional Credibility Measurement Based on Structure of Transaction Costs: A Case Study of Ongniud Banner in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region." *Ecological Economics* 159 (2019): 212–225. doi:[10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.01.019](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.01.019).
- Falvey, Rod, Neil Foster, and Olga Memedovic. *The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence*. UNIDO Working Papers. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2006. Accessed October 10, 2017. www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/Role_of_intellectual_property_rights_in_technology_transfer_and_economic_growth.pdf
- Fawcett, Louise. "The Iraq War Ten Years on: Assessing the Fallout." *International Affairs* 89, no. 2 (2013): 325–343. doi:[10.1111/1468-2346.12020](https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12020).
- Feng, Lei, Helen X. H. Bao, and Yan Jiang. "Land Reallocation Reform in Rural China: A Behavioral Economics Perspective." *Land Use Policy* 41 (2014): 246–259. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.05.006](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.05.006).
- Fisher, Franklin M. *Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Fold, Niels, Albert N. M. Allotey, Per Kalvig, and Lasse Moeller-Jensen. "Grounding Institutions Through Informal Practice: Credibility in Artisanal Mining of Aggregates, Ghana." *Land Use Policy* 79, no. 12 (2018): 922–931. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.06.022](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.06.022).

- Franco, Jennifer C., Sofía Monsalve, and Saturnino M. Borrás. "Democratic Land Control and Human Rights." *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability* 15 (2015): 66–71. doi:[10.1016/j.cosust.2015.08.010](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2015.08.010).
- Freeman, Richard B. "Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders: The Debate over Flexibility and Labour Market Performance." *International Economic Journal* 19, no. 2 (2005): 129–130. doi:[10.1080/10168730500080675](https://doi.org/10.1080/10168730500080675).
- Freeman, Alan and Guglielmo Carchedi, eds. *Marx and Non-Equilibrium Economics*. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995.
- Fries, Steven, and Anita Taci. "Cost Efficiency of Banks in Transition: Evidence from 289 Banks in 15 Post-Communist Countries." *Journal of Banking and Finance* 29, no. 1 (2005): 55–81. doi:[10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.016](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.016).
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, NY: Free Press, 1992.
- Furukawa, Yuichi. "The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Endogenous Growth: Is Stronger Always Better?" *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 31, no. 11 (2007): 3644–3670. doi:[10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.011](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.011).
- Gao, Liangliang, Dingqiang Sun, and Jikun Huang. "Impact of Land Tenure Policy on Agricultural Investments in China: Evidence from a Panel Data Study." *China Economic Review* 45 (2017): 244–252. doi:[10.1016/j.chieco.2017.07.005](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2017.07.005).
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1984.
- Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 9, no. 3 (2004): 271–303. doi:[10.1023/B:JOEG.0000038933.16398.ed](https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOEG.0000038933.16398.ed).
- Gomes, Sharlene L., and Leon M. Hermans. "Institutional Function and Urbanization in Bangladesh: How Peri-Urban Communities Respond to Changing Environments." *Land Use Policy* 79, no. 12 (2018): 932–941. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.09.041](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.09.041).
- Hale, Henry E. "Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics* 63, no. 4 (2011): 581–617. doi:[10.1017/S0043887111000189](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887111000189).
- Heckman, J. J., and C. Pages. 2000. *The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American Labor Markets*. NBER Working Papers, no. 7773. Accessed on May 23, 2016. www.nber.org/papers/w7773
- Helliwell, John F. "Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth." *British Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 2 (1994): 225–248. doi:[10.1017/S0007123400009790](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400009790).
- Ho, Peter. *Unmaking China's Development: Function and Credibility of Institutions*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- Ho, Peter. "An Endogenous Theory of Property Rights: Opening the Black Box of Institutions." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 6 (2016): 1121–1144. doi:[10.1080/03066150.2016.1253560](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1253560).
- Ho, Peter. "Empty Institutions, Non-Credibility and Pastoralism: China's Grazing Ban, Mining and Ethnicity." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 6 (2016): 1145–1176. doi:[10.1080/03066150.2016.1239617](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1239617).
- Ho, Peter. "The 'Credibility Thesis' and Its Application to Property Rights: (in)Secure Land Tenure and Social Welfare in China." *Land Use Policy* 40 (2014): 13–27. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.09.019](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2013.09.019).
- Ho, Peter. "In Defense of Endogenous, Spontaneously Ordered Development: The Institutional Structure of China's Rural Urban Property Rights." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 40, no. 6 (2013): 1087–1118. doi:[10.1080/03066150.2013.866553](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.866553).
- Ho, Peter, ed. *Developmental Dilemmas: Land Reform and Institutional Change in China*. 2nd paperback ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009.
- Ho, Peter, and Max Spoor. "Whose Land? The Political Economy of Cadastral Development in Transitional States." *Land Use Policy* 23, no. 4 (2006): 580–587. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2005.05.007](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2005.05.007).
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. "What Are Institutions?" *Journal of Economic Issues* 40, no. 1 (2006): 1–25. doi:[10.1080/00213624.2006.11506879](https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2006.11506879).

- Hodgson, Geoffrey. *The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism*. London, UK: Routledge, 2004.
- Hou, C. C., and J. W. Hou. "Evolution of Economic Institutions and China's Economic Reform." *Social Science Journal* 39, no. 3 (2002): 363–379. doi:[10.1016/S0362-3319\(02\)00206-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0362-3319(02)00206-9).
- Hu, Angang, and Wang Shaoguang. *The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China*. Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1999.
- Huang, Guangming. "'Xin Tudi Geming' [The New Land Revolution]." *Nanfang Zhoumo* (2001): 1–2.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.
- Johnson, David, and Pratheek Rebala. 2016. "Here's Where the Federal Government Owns the Most Land." *Time Magazine*, January 5. Accessed November 23, 2017. <http://time.com/4167983/federal-government-land-oregon/>
- Johnson, Miriam M. "Functionalism and Feminism: Is Estrangement Necessary?" In *Theory on Gender, Feminism on Theory*, edited by Paula England, 115–130. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993.
- Keizer, Piet. 2007. *The Concept of Institution in Economics and Sociology: A Methodological Exposition*. Discussion Paper Number 07-25. Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute.
- Kim, Annette M. "A Market without the 'Right' Property Rights." *The Economics of Transition* 12, no. 2 (2004): 275–305. doi:[10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00179.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0967-0750.2004.00179.x).
- Kim, Yee Kyoung, Keun Lee, Walter G. Park, and Kineung Choo. "Appropriate Intellectual Property Protection and Economic Growth in Countries at Different Levels of Development." *Research Policy* 41, no. 2 (2012): 358–375. doi:[10.1016/j.respol.2011.09.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2011.09.003).
- Koroso, Nesru H., Jaap A. Zevenbergen, and Monica Lengoiboni. "Land Institutions' Credibility: Analyzing the Role of Complementary Institutions." *Land Use Policy* 81 (2019): 553–564. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.11.026](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.11.026).
- Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste. *Zoological Philosophy. An Exposition with Regard to the Natural History of Animals [French Title: Philosophie Zoologique, ou Exposition Des Considérations Relatives à L'histoire Naturelle Des Animaux]*. Original Edition 1809, Translated by Hugh Elliot. London, UK: Macmillan, 1904.
- Lee, Jeong-Yeon, and Edwin Mansfield. "Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 78, no. 2 (1996): 181–186. doi:[10.2307/2109919](https://doi.org/10.2307/2109919).
- Li, Zongmin, and John Bruce. "Gender, Landlessness and Equity in Rural China." In *Developmental Dilemmas: Land Reform and Institutional Change in China*, edited by Peter Ho. London, UK: Routledge, 2005.
- Libecap, Gary D. "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 145 (1989): 6–7.
- Lipsey, Richard G., and Kelvin Lancaster. "The General Theory of Second Best." *Review of Economic Studies* 24, no. 1 (1956): 11–32. doi:[10.2307/2296233](https://doi.org/10.2307/2296233).
- Liu, Shouying, and Yue Zhang. "Cities without Slums? China's Land Regime and Dual-Track Urbanization." *Cities* 101 (2020): 102652. doi:[10.1016/j.cities.2020.102652](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2020.102652).
- Lybecker, Kristina. 2014. "The Economic Case for Strong Protection for Intellectual Property." IP Watchdog, May 2. Accessed October 10, 2017. <http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/05/02/the-economic-case-for-strong-protection-for-intellectual-property/id=49376/>
- Malesky, Edmund, and Jonathan London. "The Political Economy of Development in China and Vietnam." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17, no. 1 (2014): 395–419. doi:[10.1146/annurev-polisci-041811-150032](https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041811-150032).
- Marois, Thomas, and Ali Riza Güngen. "Credibility and Class in the Evolution of Public Banks: The Case of Turkey." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 6 (2016): 1285–1309. doi:[10.1080/03066150.2016.1176023](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1176023).
- Marshall, Leslie. "The Right to Democratic Participation in Labor Unions and the Use of the Hobbs Act to Combat Organized Crime." *Fordham Urban Law Journal* 17, no. 2 (1989): 189.

- Merton, Robert K. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1949. Reprint 1957.
- Miceli, Thomas J., C. F. Sirmans, and Geoffrey K. Turnbull. "The Dynamic Effects of Land Title Systems." *Journal of Urban Economics* 47, no. 3 (2000): 370–389. doi:[10.1006/juec.1999.2145](https://doi.org/10.1006/juec.1999.2145).
- Miyamura, Satoshi. "Rethinking Labour Market Institutions in Indian Industry: Forms, Functions and Socio-Historical Contexts." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 6 (2016): 1262–1284. doi:[10.1080/03066150.2016.1192608](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1192608).
- Mollinga, Peter P. "Secure Rights and Non-Credibility: The Paradoxical Dynamics of Canal Irrigation in India." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 6 (2016): 1310–1331. doi:[10.1080/03066150.2016.1215304](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1215304).
- Monkkonen, Paavo. "Are Civil-Law Notaries Rent-Seeking Monopolists or Essential Market Intermediaries? Endogenous Development of a Property Rights Institution in Mexico." *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 6 (2016): 1224–1248. doi:[10.1080/03066150.2016.1216983](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1216983).
- Mussa, Michael. *Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2002.
- Myrdal, G. K. *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*. London, UK: University Paperbacks, Methuen, 1957.
- Naughton, Barry J. 2008. "A Political Economy of China's Economic Transition." In *China's Great Economic Transformation*, edited by Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski, 91–136. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Neimanis, V. P. 2011. "Crown Land." In *The Canadian Encyclopedia: Geography*. Historical Foundation of Canada, May 18th version. Accessed November 22, 2017. www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/crown-land/
- Nor-Hisham, MD, Bin Saman, and Peter Ho. "A Conditional Trinity as 'No-Go' Against Non-Credible Development? Resettlement, Customary Rights and Malaysia's Kelau Dam." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 6 (2016): 1177–1205. doi:[10.1080/03066150.2016.1253559](https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1253559).
- North, Douglas C. "Economic Performance Through Time." *The American Economic Review* 84, no. 3 (1994): 359–368.
- North, Douglass C. "Institutions." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112. doi:[10.1257/jep.5.1.97](https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.97).
- North, Douglass C., and Robert Paul Thomas. *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- Oakerson, Ronald J. "Analyzing the Commons: A Framework." In *Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy*, edited by Daniel W. Bromley, 41–59. San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992.
- OECD. *The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies*. Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1994.
- Oranje, Mark, Elsona van Huyssteen, and Johan Maritz. "Rapid Urbanisation to Non-Metropolitan Urban South Africa: A Call for Accrediting Credible 'Informal' Life-Enhancing Responses and Institutions." *Cities* 96 (2020): 102487. doi:[10.1016/j.cities.2019.102487](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102487).
- Ostrom, Elinor. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Papaioannou, Elias, and Gregorios Siourounis. "Democratisation and Growth." *The Economic Journal* 118, no. 532 (2008): 1520–1551. doi:[10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02189.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02189.x).
- Parsons, Talcott. *The Social System*. London, UK: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951. Republished in 1991 by Routledge.
- Pei, Minxin. *China's Trapped Transition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Pei, Xiaolin. "Township-Village Enterprises, Local Governments, and Rural Communities: The Chinese Village as a Firm during Economic Transition." In *Between State and Private Interest: Chinese Rural Collectives and Voluntary Peasant Organisations*, edited by E. B. Vermeer, W. L. Chong-Woerkom, and F. Pieke. New York, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.
- Pei, Xiaolin. "Collective Land Ownership and Its Role in Rural Industrialization." In *Developmental Dilemmas: Land Reform and Institutional Change in China*, edited by Peter Ho. London, UK: Routledge, 2008.

- Pils, Eva. "Assessing Evictions and Expropriations in China: Efficiency, Credibility and Rights." *Land Use Policy* 58 (2016): 437–444. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.07.015](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.07.015).
- Portes, Alejandro, and Saskia Sassen-Koob. "Making It Underground: Comparative Material on the Informal Sector in Western Market Economies." *American Journal of Sociology* 93, no. 1 (1987): 30–61. doi:[10.1086/228705](https://doi.org/10.1086/228705).
- Rodrik, Dani. *Second-Best Institutions*, 1–12. NBER Working Paper, No. 14050. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.
- Rushdie, Salman. 1982. "The Empire Writes Back with a Vengeance." *The Times*, 3 July: 8.
- Santos, Alvaro. "Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development." *Virginia Journal of International Law* 50 (2009): 43–106.
- Schneider, Patricia Higinio. "International Trade, Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights: A Panel Data Study of Developed and Developing Countries." *Journal of Development Economics* 78, no. 2 (2005): 529–547. doi:[10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.09.001](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.09.001).
- Sheppard, Adam, and Katie McClymont. "Credibility Without Legitimacy? Informal Development in a Highly Regulated Context." *Cities* 97 (2020): 102520. doi:[10.1016/j.cities.2019.102520](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102520).
- Shirk, Susan L. *China, Fragile Superpower: How China's Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "A Survey of Corporate Governance." *Journal of Finance* 52, no. 2 (1997): 737–783. doi:[10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x).
- Short, Helen. "Ownership, Control, Financial Structure and the Performance of Firms." *Journal of Economic Surveys* 8, no. 3 (1994): 203–249. doi:[10.1111/j.1467-6419.1994.tb00102.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.1994.tb00102.x).
- Sjaastad, Espen, and Ben Cousins. "Formalisation of Land Rights in the South: An Overview." *Land Use Policy* 26, no. 1 (2009): 1–9. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2008.05.004](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2008.05.004).
- Smith, Adam. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, edited by Edwin Cannan (1904 edition). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1776.
- Smith, Robert J. "Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife." *Cato Journal* 1, no. 1 (1981): 439–468.
- Streets, D. G., K. F. Yarber, J. H. Woo, and G. R. Carmichael. "Biomass Burning in Asia: Annual and Seasonal Estimates and Atmospheric Emissions." *Global Biogeochemical Cycles* 17, no. 4 (2003): 1099. doi:[10.1029/2003GB002040](https://doi.org/10.1029/2003GB002040).
- Thelen, Kathleen. "The Explanatory Power of Historical Institutionalism." In *Akteure, Mechanismen, Modellen: Zur Theorie-Fähigkeit Makro-Sozialer Analysen*, edited by Renate Mayntz, 91–107. Frankfurt, Germany: Campus, 2002.
- UNDP. *China, the Millennium Development Goals, and the Post-2015 Development Agenda*. Beijing, China: United Nations Development Programme China, 2015.
- Veblen, Thorstein B. *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions*. New York, NY: Macmillan, 1899.
- Veblen, Thorstein B. *The Instinct of Workmanship, and the State of the Industrial Arts*. New York, NY: Macmillan, 1914.
- Wang, Hui, Juer Tong, Fubing Su, Guoxue Wei, and Ran Tao. "To Reallocate or Not: Reconsidering the Dilemma in China's Agricultural Land Tenure Policy." *Land Use Policy* 28, no. 4 (2011): 805–814. doi:[10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.01.006](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.01.006).
- Martin, Weitzman, and Chenggang Xu. "Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 18, no. 2 (1994): 121–145. doi:[10.1006/jcec.1994.1020](https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.1994.1020).
- Wen, Yi. *The Making of an Economic Superpower-Unlocking China's Secret of Rapid Industrialization*. Working Paper Series, 2015-006B. Research Division Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2015.
- World Bank. 2001. *Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. *Global Financial Development Report 2013: Rethinking the Role of State in Finance*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012.

- World Bank. *Historical Classification by Income in XLS Format. Period 2017–2018*. World Bank Country and Lending Groups, 2017. Accessed October 11, 2017. <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>
- Zhang, Yue. "The Credibility of Slums: Informal Housing and Urban Governance in India." *Land Use Policy* 79, no. 12 (2018): 876–890. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.05.029.
- Zhao, Heng, and Karlis Rokpelnis. "Local Perceptions of Grassland Degradation in China: A Socio-Anthropological Reading of Endogenous Knowledge and Institutional Credibility." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 43, no. 6 (2016): 1206–1223. doi:10.1080/03066150.2016.1192609.
- Zitelmann, Rainer. 2019. "State Capitalism? No, The Private Sector Was and Is the Main Driver of China's Economic Growth." *Forbes*, September 30. Accessed June 4, 2020. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/rainerzitelmann/2019/09/30/state-capitalism-no-the-private-sector-was-and-is-the-main-driver-of-chinas-economic-growth/#1d51a56a27cb>
- Zeković, Slavka, Ksenija Petovar, and Bin Md Saman Nor-Hisham. "The Credibility of Illegal and Informal Construction: Assessing Legalization Policies in Serbia." *Cities* 97 (2020): 102548. doi: 10.1016/j.cities.2019.102548.